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dc.contributor.author권세원*
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-12T16:31:05Z-
dc.date.available2025-03-12T16:31:05Z-
dc.date.issued2025*
dc.identifier.issn1544-6123*
dc.identifier.otherOAK-36646*
dc.identifier.urihttps://dspace.ewha.ac.kr/handle/2015.oak/271294-
dc.description.abstractThe Compensation Discussion and Analysis section in proxy statements provides narrative data on how Compensation Committees define and apply their Compensation Philosophy. However, the extent to which these philosophies—pay-for-performance and the attraction and retention of talented executives—translate into executive compensation practices remains unclear. To address this, we conduct a textual analysis of proxy statements from 2007 to 2016 to examine whether Compensation Committees align executive compensation with their stated philosophies. The findings show a stronger focus on pay-for-performance is linked to higher excess compensation, especially in firms lacking a general counsel among top officers and not employing a compensation consultant. © 2024*
dc.languageEnglish*
dc.publisherElsevier Ltd*
dc.subjectCompensation committee*
dc.subjectCompensation disclosure*
dc.subjectCompensation philosophy*
dc.subjectExecutive compensation*
dc.subjectNarrative disclosure*
dc.titleDo compensation committees do what they say they do? Evidence from narrative disclosure in proxy statements*
dc.typeArticle*
dc.relation.volume73*
dc.relation.indexSSCI*
dc.relation.indexSCOPUS*
dc.relation.journaltitleFinance Research Letters*
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.frl.2024.106637*
dc.identifier.wosidWOS:001402426600001*
dc.identifier.scopusid2-s2.0-85212565149*
dc.author.googleKim N.K.W.*
dc.author.googleKwon S.*
dc.author.googleShin J.Y.*
dc.contributor.scopusid권세원(57222865731)*
dc.date.modifydate20260811155411*
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경영대학 > 경영학전공 > Journal papers
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