NL repository
menu
검색
Library
Browse
Communities & Collections
By Date
Authors
Titles
Subject
My Repository
My Account
Receive email updates
Edit Profile
DSpace at EWHA
사회과학대학
경제학전공
Journal papers
View : 779 Download: 0
Price discrimination via information provision
Title
Price discrimination via information provision
Authors
Bang S.H.
;
Kim J.
Ewha Authors
방세훈
SCOPUS Author ID
방세훈
Issue Date
2013
Journal Title
Information Economics and Policy
ISSN
0167-6245
Citation
Information Economics and Policy vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 215 - 224
Keywords
Information
;
Online and offline
;
Price discrimination
;
Screening
Indexed
SSCI; SCOPUS
Document Type
Article
Abstract
We study price discrimination where different prices are offered as a bundle with different levels of information about a product. The seller's price discrimination induces high valuation buyers to purchase a good without information and low valuation buyers to purchase with information. Our analysis highlights several interesting results about price discrimination: (i) the seller's choice of information provision is the combination of full information and no information, (ii) products can be cheaper without information provision than with information provision, (iii) as a result of price discrimination, prices can be more dispersed as buyers' valuations become largely similar, and (iv) the high valuation buyers purchase a damaged good and may earn negative surplus. Furthermore, we investigate under which circumstances price discrimination is more profitable than uniform pricing. We show that a decline in transportation costs which facilitate price discrimination can be welfare reducing. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
DOI
10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.06.001
Appears in Collections:
사회과학대학
>
경제학전공
>
Journal papers
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Export
RIS (EndNote)
XLS (Excel)
XML
Show full item record
Find@EWHA
트윗하기
BROWSE
Communities & Collections
By Date
Authors
Titles
Subject