Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 방세훈 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-22T16:30:16Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-22T16:30:16Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-1821 | - |
dc.identifier.other | OAK-25671 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.ewha.ac.kr/handle/2015.oak/252209 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets. © 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | Blackwell Publishing Ltd | - |
dc.title | Reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.relation.issue | 2 | - |
dc.relation.volume | 62 | - |
dc.relation.index | SSCI | - |
dc.relation.index | SCOPUS | - |
dc.relation.startpage | 286 | - |
dc.relation.lastpage | 308 | - |
dc.relation.journaltitle | Journal of Industrial Economics | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/joie.12044 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | WOS:000337666100004 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-84901788868 | - |
dc.author.google | Bang S.H. | - |
dc.author.google | Kim J. | - |
dc.author.google | Yoon Y.-R. | - |
dc.contributor.scopusid | 방세훈(55229421200) | - |
dc.date.modifydate | 20210929152502 | - |