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Key Substitution Attacks on Lattice Signature Schemes Based on SIS Problem

Title
Key Substitution Attacks on Lattice Signature Schemes Based on SIS Problem
Authors
An, YoungjooLee, Hyang-SookLee, JuheeLim, Seongan
Ewha Authors
이향숙이주희
SCOPUS Author ID
이향숙scopus; 이주희scopus
Issue Date
2018
Journal Title
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
ISSN
1939-0114JCR Link

1939-0122JCR Link
Citation
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Publisher
WILEY-HINDAWI
Indexed
SCIE WOS
Document Type
Article
Abstract
The notion of key substitution security on digital signatures in the multiuser setting has been proposed by Menezes and Smart in 2004. Along with the unforgeability of signature, the key substitution security is very important since it is a critical requirement for the nonrepudiation and the authentication of the signature. Lattice-based signature is a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography, and the unforgeability of each scheme has been relatively well studied. In this paper, we present key substitution attacks on BLISS, Lyubashevsky's signature scheme, and GPV and thus show that these signature schemes do not provide nonrepudiation. We also suggest how to avoid key substitution attack on these schemes.
DOI
10.1155/2018/8525163
Appears in Collections:
자연과학대학 > 수학전공 > Journal papers
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