Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 심경아 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-08-28T12:08:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2016-08-28T12:08:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0920-5489 | - |
dc.identifier.other | OAK-3993 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.ewha.ac.kr/handle/2015.oak/219855 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The MQV protocol is the first authenticated key agreement protocol which uses a digital signature to sign Diffie-Hellman public keys without using any one-way hash functions. Based on the MQV protocol, Harn and Lin proposed an authenticated multiple-key agreement protocol that enables two parties to establish multiple common secret keys in a single protocol run. But the protocol was subsequently found to be flawed. Tseng proposed a new generalized MQV key agreement protocol without using one-way hash functions to overcome the weaknesses of Harn-Lin's protocol. Recently, Shao showed that Teng's protocol is insecure against signature forgery attacks and then proposed an improved authenticated multiple-key agreement protocol to resist the attacks. In this paper we show that Shao's protocol is vulnerable to unknown key-share attacks. We also point out its another potential weakness. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.title | Vulnerabilities of generalized MQV key agreement protocol without using one-way hash functions | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.relation.issue | 4 | - |
dc.relation.volume | 29 | - |
dc.relation.index | SCIE | - |
dc.relation.index | SCOPUS | - |
dc.relation.startpage | 467 | - |
dc.relation.lastpage | 470 | - |
dc.relation.journaltitle | Computer Standards and Interfaces | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.csi.2006.11.002 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | WOS:000246292600007 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-33947700965 | - |
dc.author.google | Shim K.-A. | - |
dc.date.modifydate | 20200911081002 | - |