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사회과학대학
경제학전공
Journal papers
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Anti-competitiveness of instant messenger tying by microsoft
Title
Anti-competitiveness of instant messenger tying by microsoft
Authors
Kim J.
;
Bang S.H.
;
Hwang S.
Ewha Authors
방세훈
SCOPUS Author ID
방세훈
Issue Date
2011
Journal Title
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
ISSN
0018-280X
Citation
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 185 - 198
Keywords
Foreclosure
;
Instant messenger
;
Microsoft
;
Multi-homing
;
Tying
Indexed
SSCI; SCOPUS
Document Type
Article
Abstract
In this paper, we theoretically analyze Microsoft's tying practice in the instant messenger market. Using a model that highlights distinct features of the instant messenger, which are different from the cases of the web browser and the media player, we show that Microsoft can leverage its monopoly power in the operating system (OS) market to the instant messenger market through tying strategy. Microsoft's messenger tying hurts consumers because it enables Microsoft to monopolize messenger market and so fully exploit consumer's willingness to pay to the OS-messenger bundle. However, since tying saves installing costs, consumer loss is not so serious that total surplus improves under messenger tying. Finally we show that such results are robust to the possibilities of multi-homing in the instant messenger market. © Hitotsubashi University.
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