Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 윤정열 | * |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-02T08:14:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-06-02T08:14:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 1997 | * |
dc.identifier.issn | 0734-306X | * |
dc.identifier.other | OAK-17295 | * |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.ewha.ac.kr/handle/2015.oak/244276 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This article analyzes the efficiency of the rank-order contract for a finite number of risk-neutral agents under both moral hazard and adverse selection. The first-best outcome is shown to be supported by a set of rank-order contracts which penalize a small fraction of agents but do so heavily. The article also shows how these rank-order contracts compare with those giving a large prize to few agents. Finally, the article provides an informal argument for why firms do not follow a penalty-giving rank-order contract in their promotion policies as often as the theory predicts. | * |
dc.language | English | * |
dc.title | On the efficiency of the rank-order contract under moral hazard and adverse selection | * |
dc.type | Article | * |
dc.relation.issue | 3 | * |
dc.relation.volume | 15 | * |
dc.relation.index | SSCI | * |
dc.relation.index | SCOPUS | * |
dc.relation.startpage | 466 | * |
dc.relation.lastpage | 494 | * |
dc.relation.journaltitle | Journal of Labor Economics | * |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-0038873985 | * |
dc.author.google | Yun J. | * |
dc.contributor.scopusid | 윤정열(55420000000) | * |
dc.date.modifydate | 20240415122730 | * |