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Deposit Insurance, Banks' Moral Hazard, and Regulation: Evidence from the ASEAN Countries and Korea
- Deposit Insurance, Banks' Moral Hazard, and Regulation: Evidence from the ASEAN Countries and Korea
- Kim I.; Han Y.
- Ewha Authors
- SCOPUS Author ID
- Issue Date
- Journal Title
- Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
- vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 56 - 71
- deposit insurance; moral hazard; regulatory quality; risk-taking
- SSCI; SCOPUS
- In this paper, we analyze the effect of deposit insurance (DI) on banks' risk-taking for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and Korea. Previous studies focus primarily on developed countries or use mixed samples. The utilization of a panel data set consisting of 406 banks across our sample countries reveals that banks engage more actively in risk-taking in the presence of DI, that the adverse effect of DI is aggravated with extensive coverage, and that DI-related moral hazard is curbed through better regulatory quality. Particularly, risk-taking is relatively higher in Korea, but no difference is detected in the stabilizing effect of the regulatory quality. Relevant policy implications are offered. © 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.
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