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Deposit Insurance, Banks' Moral Hazard, and Regulation: Evidence from the ASEAN Countries and Korea

Title
Deposit Insurance, Banks' Moral Hazard, and Regulation: Evidence from the ASEAN Countries and Korea
Authors
Kim I.Han Y.
Ewha Authors
김인배
SCOPUS Author ID
김인배scopus
Issue Date
2014
Journal Title
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
ISSN
1540-496XJCR Link
Citation
vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 56 - 71
Keywords
deposit insurancemoral hazardregulatory qualityrisk-taking
Publisher
Routledge
Indexed
SSCI; SCOPUS WOS scopus
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the effect of deposit insurance (DI) on banks' risk-taking for the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and Korea. Previous studies focus primarily on developed countries or use mixed samples. The utilization of a panel data set consisting of 406 banks across our sample countries reveals that banks engage more actively in risk-taking in the presence of DI, that the adverse effect of DI is aggravated with extensive coverage, and that DI-related moral hazard is curbed through better regulatory quality. Particularly, risk-taking is relatively higher in Korea, but no difference is detected in the stabilizing effect of the regulatory quality. Relevant policy implications are offered. © 2014 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.
DOI
10.1080/1540496X.2014.1013875
Appears in Collections:
사회과학대학 > 경제학전공 > Journal papers
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