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Central bank's retained profits and discount windows: A bureaucratic organization's discretion-seeking hypothesis

Title
Central bank's retained profits and discount windows: A bureaucratic organization's discretion-seeking hypothesis
Authors
Kim I.
Ewha Authors
김인배
SCOPUS Author ID
김인배scopus
Issue Date
2013
Journal Title
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
ISSN
1540-496XJCR Link
Citation
vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 84 - 102
Indexed
SSCI; SCOPUS WOS scopus
Abstract
A recent study using data on seventy-one countries revealed that the central bank's retained profits serve as financial leverage for its discretion to choose the discount window, which tends to confer more benefits to bureaucrats than other monetary instruments. As an extension, we investigate the case of Korea. The Bank of Korea introduced the Profits-Retaining Clause (PRC) in 1962, elucidating two purposes: to reduce the monetary base and to secure credibility. Upon showing that these claims are not quite convincing, we confirm that the PRC probably served bureaucratic interests. In particular, this paper, using time-series data, supports the aforementioned cross-country study. © 2013 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.
DOI
10.2753/REE1540-496X490307
Appears in Collections:
사회과학대학 > 경제학전공 > Journal papers
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