View : 219 Download: 0

Two-Level Game and Politics of the United States-North Korea Negotiation

Title
Two-Level Game and Politics of the United States-North Korea Negotiation
Authors
Park, Ihn-hwi
Ewha Authors
박인휘
SCOPUS Author ID
박인휘scopus
Issue Date
2020
Journal Title
KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS
ISSN
1016-3271JCR Link

1941-4641JCR Link
Citation
KOREAN JOURNAL OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 437 - 456
Keywords
two-level gamewin-setUS-North Korea Hanoi summitdenuclearizationinternational negotiationTrump and Kim Jong Un
Publisher
KOREA INST DEFENSE ANALYSES-KIDA
Indexed
SSCI; SCOPUS; KCI WOS
Document Type
Article
Abstract
When the second U.S.-North Korea Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam ended abruptly without a deal, critics and experts argued that U.S. President Trump, considering the domestic pressure, changed his goals and interests at the very last minute. To theoretically explain the negotiation process in Hanoi, this study analyzes the win-set structure of the United States and North Korea. This study also aims to examine the causes of the failure by comparing the agreement zones between the United States and North Korea's win-sets before and after the summit. Two-level game theory explains how negotiating countries with conflicting interests achieve an agreement and what kinds of strategies the governments use to maximize their own national interests. The key assumption of the two-level game theory is the linkage between domestic politics and international affairs, and the interconnection was widely suggested by many scholars including Gabriel A. Almond, James N. Rosenau, and Bruce M. Russett. Building on to this literature, Putnam's two-level game theory introduced the concept of a "win-set" and examined the international negotiation process thoroughly using this theoretical model. Based on the analysis of the two parties' win-sets, this study finds that the United States intentionally ended the negotiation without a deal by contracting the size of its win-set. The United States shifted its interest from the original position, which is "trading partial (or symbolic) dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons with partial removal of economic sanctions," to the new interest position including the abandonment of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) referred to as "Yongbyon Plus Alpha" and the agreement on a roadmap to denuclearization.
Show the fulltext
DOI
10.22883/kjda.2020.32.3.006
Appears in Collections:
스크랜튼대학 > 국제학부 > Journal papers
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Export
RIS (EndNote)
XLS (Excel)
XML


qrcode

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

BROWSE