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사회과학대학
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Journal papers
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Reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers
Title
Reverse price discrimination with bayesian buyers
Authors
Bang S.H.
;
Kim J.
;
Yoon Y.-R.
Ewha Authors
방세훈
SCOPUS Author ID
방세훈
Issue Date
2014
Journal Title
Journal of Industrial Economics
ISSN
0022-1821
Citation
Journal of Industrial Economics vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 286 - 308
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Indexed
SSCI; SCOPUS
Document Type
Article
Abstract
This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule. We show that, in this environment, prices are not monotone in buyers' prior valuations. Interestingly, this results in the possibility that a seller intentionally offers a higher price to a low valuation buyer rather than a high valuation buyer (Reverse Price Discrimination). We derive this result in both monopoly and duopoly markets. © 2014 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
DOI
10.1111/joie.12044
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