The Agreement on Government Procurement and Expanding Membership

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide and insight into the Agreement on Government Procurement: to improve the Agreement on Government Procurement and expand membership. The market related to government procurement has historically been the largest size of market. Simultaneously, it has also been considered the most protected area in relation to international trade. Before the Tokyo Round, there were no international regulations on government procurement. In fact, government procurement was explicitly excluded in application of GATT by Article Ⅲ. The result of the strong nature of protectionism and absence of international regulations was that procurement practices often discriminated against foreign suppliers. If many countries pursue such practices, the end result for the world as a whole is likely to be an uncooperative equilibrium. This outcome is inferior compared to a cooperative outcome where governments agree to refrain from discrimination, or to abide by rules that must be met for discrimination to be permitted. Recognition of the necessity for international regulation and guidance on government procurement increased throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)- originally negotiated during the Tokyo Round- was renegotiated for the second time during the Uruguay Round. But the membership in the GPA has largely remained limited to high-income countries, Inducing greater participation is important, as procurement is the major "hole" in the international trade. Addressing the issue of "multilateralizing" the GPA should be given priority by policymakers. The fact that participation remains limited suggests that non-members of the GPA perceive the costs of accession to outweigh the benefits. The entities concerned with the GPA must satisfy many procedural requirements to ensure due process and transparency in terms of costs. The benefits are likely to include a reduction in procurement costs by constraining rent-seeking activities and perhaps more important, positive spillover effects that result from transparency and accountability. What might be done to expand membership significantly? These questions are important for two reasons. First, inefficient public procurement can give rise to large welfare losses. Second, pressures are mounting to expand the coverage of multilateral rules. To improve the GPA and expand membership, I argue to strengthen enforcement: to liberalize the multilateral agreement: and to compromise requirements for membership. Research efforts are required especially to identify and quantify the benefits of the GPA. That would encourage non-member countries to join the GPA.;본 논문은 정부조달협정에 대한 이해를 돕고, 정부조달협정의 문제점인 제한된 가입국(Limited Membership)의 확산을 위한 방법을 모색하고자 한다. 정부조달협정은 국제무역에서 큰 비중을 차지하는 정부조달 시장의 차별적 무역관행을 규제하려는 움직임이다. 그 동안 정부조달시장 분야는 공공기관의 특성상 내국민대우, 비차별 원칙의 적용의무가 면제되어 있었다. 이런 예외조항을 이용해, 각국 정부는 법률이나 정책, 관행을 통해 자국 산 상품이나 서비스의 우선구매원칙 등 차별적 무역조치를 시행함으로써 자국의 산업, 특히 국제경쟁력이 취약한 중소기업을 보호·육성할 수 있었다. 그러나 각국 경제에서 공공부문이 차지하는 비중이 커지면서 1970 년대 이후 정부조달상의 차별적 무역관행은 세계무역의 신장을 저해하는 비관세장벽의 하나로 인식되기에 이르렀다. 정부조달의 공정하고 신속하며 효과적인 집행을 보장하기위한 목적의 정부조달협정은 도쿄라운드와 우루과이 라운드를 거치면서 적용범위의 확대와 집행력의 강화를 이루었다. 하지만, 가입국이 일부 선진국에 국한되어있는 문제점을 안고있다. 이 논문을 통해 그 문제점의 원인을 비용편익분석을 통해 알아보고, 차별적 조달의 논리적 근거를 고찰해 보기로 한다. 정부조달협정은 자유화압력을 강화할 수 있는 두개의 유인, 즉 공공예산상의 구속요인과 이의신청절차를 통한 경쟁력을 가지고 있다. 마지막으로 이러한 경쟁력을 강화 시키고, 더 나아가서 가입국 확대의 대안은 무엇인지를 결론부분에서 제시해 보기로 한다.