Harmonization of the international norm with inter-Korean trade and North-South Korean relations

Abstract

GATT/WTO는 냉전체제가 종식된 이후 경제적인 경쟁과 논리가 지배하는 상황에서 그 역할이 더욱 증대되고 있다. MFN(최혜국 대우원칙)은 내국민 대우와 함께 GATT/WTO의 중추적인 두 가지 원칙이다. GATT/WTO의 Article I에 따르면 한 체약국이 어느 나라에 최혜국 대우를 부여하면 그 대우는 다른 국가들에게도 똑같이 부여된다는 것으로 무역의 자유화와 무차별을 지향하는 원칙이다. 이 최혜국 대우 원칙에 대한 많은 예외나 위반은 GATT/WTO 체제 자체에 큰 위협이 되기에 이의 위반은 논쟁의 여지가 많고 국제 규범에 있어서 최혜국 대우의 준수가 중시된다. 이러한 국제적 규범과 기준이 적용되는 무역체제에서 1998년 대한민국 정부는 국내 무역 선언을 발표하고 무관세 납북교역을 선언하였다. 한반도의 특수한 관계상, 대한민국과 북한은 남북 기본 합의서에 1992년에 동의하고 경제적인 협력과 교류 및 무역을 증진시켜 왔다. 이러한 교류와 무역의 증진에 대하여 미국은 남북 쌀 교역을 계기로 무관세 남북무역이 GATT의 최혜국 대우에 위반된다고 주장하였고 몇 년 전 동서무역에 대해서도 GATT의 몇몇 체약국단이 불만을 표명한 적이 있다. 그러나 당시 대한민국은 교역량이 좀 더 증대될 때까지 논의를 GATT에 상정하는 것을 연기하였다. 그러나 그 이후 남북교역량의 계속적인 증가추세를 고려할 때, 남북교역과 최혜국 대우 원칙의 마찰의 가능성이 여전히 존재하고 또한 증대되고 있다. 이와 더불어 최혜국 대우의 원칙과 밀접한 관계에 있는 원산지 규정 협정(Agreement on rule of origin)에 있어서도 마찰의 가능성이 제기될 수 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 GATT의 최혜국 대우 규정과 그에 대한 예외를 살펴보고 원산지 규정협정(Agreement on rule of origin)을 살펴보았다. 이에 이어 규정의 적용 사례를 제시하였다. GATT/WTO는 역사적으로 볼 때, 규정의 직접적인 해석보다는 실제적인 적용과 사례의 역할에 더 크게 의미를 부여했음을 알 수 있다. 따라서 독일(국내 무역으로 승인 받은 예), 비체약국간과 체약국단의 협정이 승인된 예 및 자유무역지대로서 NAFTA의 예 남북 무역에 있어 가능한 상황과 대응될 수 있는 사례들이 있어 규정의 실제적인 적용이 제시되었다. 이러한 사례들이 실제 국제 규범과 최혜국 대우 원칙에 적용에 있어 상호 직접적 규정보다 더 큰 역할을 할 것으로 기대된다. 따라서 이러한 규정상의 원칙과 사례에서 얻은 남북교역에 대한 시사점이 도출되었다. 이에 따른 시사점을 살펴보면, 남북교역은 내국무역으로서 민족 자결권의 행사로 인정 받을 수 있겠으나 실제에 있어 대한민국의 무역의존도를 고려할 때 적용이 어려울 것으로 판단된다. 독일의 GATT 가입 시 가입조항을 이용한 예를 볼 때 북한의 가입 시 국제적 승인을 얻을 수 있겠으나 불투명 할 것으로 판단된다. 내국교역으로 인정 받은 경우 원산지 규정은 큰 문제가 없을 것으로 판단된다. 국제교역으로 간주될 경우 예외적 조치를 부여 받거나 남북 기본합의서를 잠정협정으로 발전 보완함으로 국제적 승인을 얻을 가능성이 있다. Article 25조에 따른 예외적 조치는 가능성이 많으나 이의 한시성이 문제가 된다. 남북기본합의서를 잠정적으로 발전시킬 경우 비체약국단이 포함된 경우라도 Article24조를 적용 받은 EFTA, LFTAT와 EC등의 예에서 볼 때 문제가 없을 것으로 판단되고, 남북한의 특수 관계상 기본합의서를 잠정협정으로 보관하여 자유무역지대를 발전시키는 방향으로 나가는 것의 가능성이 크다. 원산지 규정에 있어서 ‘Transshipment’ 문제가 제기될 수 있으나 아직 구체적인 원산지 규정 협정이 성립되지 않은 상태라 충돌의 가능성은 크지 않을 것으로 판단된다. 그러나 협정의 기본적인 두 가지 접근법(‘실제적변환’ 접근법과 ‘가치부가’ 접근법)에 기초한 원산지 규정을 마련하도록 주의를 기울이는 것이 좋을 것으로 생각된다. 이상의 것들을 토대로 볼 때 무역의 자유화를 기본으로 하는 국제규범과 GATT/WTO에서 남북 무관세교역의 조화롭게 승인 받을 수 있는 가능성은 국제규범의 탄력성 측면에서 볼 때 긍정적이라고 할 수 있겠다. ; The economic agenda is emphasized more than political agenda in the wake of Cold War and WTO regime. For this reason, the role of WTO becomes greater and greater. The Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) provision in GATT/WTO is one of the basic and fundamental principle with National treatment. According to Article I, the provision states that if a member nation gives “any other nation” Most-Favored-Nation treatment, it must give the same treatment to member nation, too. In GATT’47 and WTO, because of the practical need, exceptions of MFN are permitted and granted. But much elasticity originated from the exceptions is a great threat to the existence of the WTO. Therefore, the violation of MFN tempts to invoke the hot controversies. In 1988, South Korean government issued the domestic trade declaration and imposes no tariffs on goods originating from North Korea, as South Korea does not regard North Korea as a separate nation. And South and North Korea put into effect the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (hereinafter referred to as the “Basic South-North Agreement”) on February 19, 1992. The volume of trade and economic cooperation continues to expand. Recently, Seoul stated that its export of rice to North Korea should be regarded as internal commerce. The United States challenged this. Unhappy with the North-South rice trade, U.S. argued that it is the violation of MFN in Article I of GATT. At that time, the Korean government postponed to submit this controversy to the GATT until the volume of trade become more substantial. Considering the expansion trend of the trade, as the volume of trade increase, so does the possibility that contracting party of GATT will complain this trade. Regarding the controversy surrounding MFN treatment, the Rule of Origin (or rule of product origin) can be most controversial in inter-Korean trade. To find an adequate method of harmonization, the current inter-Korean trade situation was described in the chapter II, which suggested the database for inter-Korean trade that was built by Dr. Eberstadt and myself in AEI. In chapters III and IV, I investigate the MFN provisions and exceptions in GATT and WTO. In addition, I investigate the Agreement on the Rule of Origin in chapter V. Based on these international norm, the cases in the practical international economy in chapter VI were searched to examine the applicability of the interpretation of MFN treatment and the rule of origin and cases to Korean case. In chapter VII, I examine the dual aspects of inter-Korean trade and economic cooperation and integration. And I provide implication from the MFN and the rule of origin provision, and case studies. I conclude by summarizing and proposing the desirable view and ways for harmonization. Among exceptions, Article XXIV (territorial application-frontier traffic-customs union and free-trade areas) and Article XV (waiver in joint-action by the contracting parties) are most relevant to the Korean case. According to Article XXIV, a free trade agreement and an interim agreement leading to the free trade agreement that includes the non-contracting party seems to be permitted. According to Article XXV, one must not follow strict conditions to obtain a waiver in GATT. In WTO, however, its system is divided into GATT’94, GATS, and TRIPS. So the MFN provisions and exceptions can be suggested in three parts separately. In GATT’94, Article XXIV and Article XXV are similar with the ones in GATT’47 but strengthen and tighten the standard for the review and requirement. In GATS, Annex on Article II exceptions and Article V (Economic Integration) can be pointed. In TRIPS, Article IV and Article V permits the exceptions for MFN treatment. Regarding the Agreement on Rules of Origin, the rule of origin shall be defined as those laws, regulations an administrative determinations of general application applied by any Member to determine the country of origin of goods provided such rules of origin are not related to contractual or autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences going beyond the application of paragraph 1 of Article I of GATT’94. However, exceptions exist in ANNEX II (Common declaration with regard to preferential rules of origin) of the Agreement. As seen in the history of GATT/WTO, the previous cases and practical application of GATT/WTO are more crucial than the direct interpretation of the provisions. The case studies were executed. As to the examples related to MFN treatment, one may refer to four kinds of examples. First, Germany was suggested as providing the example of gaining the international approval as domestic trade. Second, for the examples of agreement between contraction party and non-contracting party, three cases were mentioned (a. The examples of EC and Morocco and Tunisia, b. EC and LAFTA, c. Central American Free-Trade Area). Third, the example of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) was referred as the example of the free trade area permitted in GATT/WTO. Regarding the examples of rules of origin, the imaginable condition for the “transshipment” problems was referred for the possible controversial situation of inter-Korean trade. From these investigations, the following implications were drawn. First, no tariff inter-Korean trade can be proposed as the domestic trade. First, Koreas can proclaim this domestic trade as “self-determination of the people” according to paragraph 3 of Article XXXI in Vienna convention on the law of Treaties and Article 103 of United Nation charter. But it is unclear if this claim can be admitted by rest of the world. Second, considering the similarities of German situation with Korean situation, Koreas follow the German case. But as South Korea is already the contracting party of WTO, Koreas can acquire the permission on the special relation between South and North Korea via Article XII in the case that North Korea becomes a contracting party of WTO. But it seems to be unclear when it is possible for North Korea to join the GATT/WTO. Regarding the rule of origin, it would not cause the dispute. Second, if the no tariff inter-Korean trade may be regarded as international trade. As to the MFN treatment, two ways can be suggested. First, Koreas can get the waiver. Second, Korea can develop the Basic South-North Agreement as Interim Agreement leading to the free trade area. As to waiver, under Article XXV there seems to exist great deal of potential to be utilized for harmonization of Inter-Korean trade with the GATT/WTO. But as the waiver terminates, Koreas should have it extended. So this cannot be a permanent solution. One of the crucial problems is that it requires Koreas to admit that they are in violation of GATT/WTO, regardless to waiver granted. It is therefore difficult to choose a waiver as the best choice for Koreas. Regarding the interim Agreement leading to free trade area, considering the previous provisions and examples, Article XXIV provides exceptions for custom unions(CUs), free trade areas(FTAs), and interim agreements leading to either. In addition, the GATT/WTO exception allows for an “interim agreement” to depart from GATT/WTO. Furthermore, the Basic South North Agreement contains a lot of components leading to the interim agreement. Although North Korea is currently not a contracting party of GATT and WTO, the “territories of contracting parties” condition does not, therefore, strictly apply in the application of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV in the examples of EFTA, LAFTA and EC. Historically, the previous examples of the translation and application of the provisions of GATT/WTO will have a more crucial impact on the practice of the GATT/WTO and international context than the direct translation of the words of provisions. Therefore the large possibility exists for Koreas to gain the permission on inter-Korean trade as interim stage leading to the free trade area. Regarding the agreement on rule of origin, this should be necessarily resolved to promote the humanization as inter-Korean trade may evoke the:”transshipment” problem. But according to WTO, there is no harmonized and clear guideline for this. There is therefore little possibility to incur the controversy over the rule of origin. However, Koreas should be careful to prepare to meet the standards presented in the WTO (“substantial transformation” approach and “value-added” approach). Based on the following discussion, even though GATT/WTO and international norm seek the liberalization of international trade through MFN, it permitted fundamental exceptions in the provisions itself. This fact contributes to and increases the positive expectation for inter-Korean trade to harmonize with GATT/WTO and international norms.