프랑스 官職賣買와 絶對王政의 形成

Abstract

本稿에서는 Henri 4세와 Louis 13세 시대의 官職賣買를 통하여 絶對主義 國家의 형성 과정을 考察하였다. 中世 以來 발전되어 온 官職의 賣買는 1604年 官職의 世襲 權利를 인정하는 官職年稅(paulette 또는 le droit annuel)의 설치로 말미암아 최종적인 형태로 완성되었다. 官職의 賣買는 官僚機構의 형성을 가능하게 하고 歲入의 增大를 가져왔을 뿐 아니라 부르조아 階層 출신의 관리들과 貴族 세력간의 對立을 형성함으로써 상대적으로 王權을 强化하였다. 그러나 官職의 賣買와 世襲의 허용은 公的인 機能과 私的인 所有物과의 구분을 모호하게 만들었으며, 國王의 權力은 行政權力을 私有하는 官職所有者들에 의해 제한되었다. 그리하여 새로운 형태의 封建主義가 대두할 위험성이 제기되었다. 즉 官吏들은 독립적인 엘리트 집단을 구성하여 자신들이 官職에 투자한 利權이 위협받을 때에는 언제든지 國王에 대해 反抗할 수 있는 세력으로 成長하였던 것으로, 이러한 狀況은 30年戰爭의 위기와 더불어 國王에게 커다란 위협으로 등장하였다. Richelieu 下에서 國王 行政府는 國王의 直轄官僚인 intendants을 지방에 파견함으로써 官吏들의 權力을 제한하는 동시에 國王의 權威를 회복하려고 시도하였다. 이렇게 하여 絶對主義의 마지막 障碍要素인 官吏들의 權限 축소가 시작되었고 관직매매로 인해 制限받는 君主體制로부터 絶對的인 君主體制로 移行하는 '革命'이 시작되었다. 中央權力으로부터 疎外된 官吏階層은 高等法院을 중심으로 하여, 17세기 前半의 수많은 大衆暴動에 참여하여 國王의 絶對體制 강화 시도에 저항하였으며 이러한 불만의 축적이 噴出된 것이 1648年의 Fronde 內亂이었다. 그러나 근본적으로 官吏들의 政治的 요구는 훨씬 제한된 것으로서 이들은 絶對主義의 政治的 변화에 반대한다기 보다는 그것을 자신들의 利害關係에 유리하도록 調整하는 데에 더욱 관심이 있었다. 한편 절대주의 국가로의 移行은 그 자체가 어떤 遠大한, 그리고 체계적인 계획 아래에서 이루어진 것이 아니라 어디까지나 상황(특히 전쟁의 압력)에 의해 요구되는 便宜主義와 實用性의 범위 내에서 수행되었으므로 그 과정은 혼란되고 非組織的인 것이었다. 따라서 관직매매를 둘러싼 國王과 官吏들 간의 투쟁에서 어느 한 편도 상대방에 대해 全面的인 공격을 하지 못하였으며, 그 대신 權力의 侵蝕, 흥정, 妥協의 방법에 의존하였다. 결론적으로 이 시기에 시작된 政治的 諸 變化의 모호한 性格은 特權의 存續과 旣存 社會 構造의 維持를 결과했고 이러한 絶對主義의 限界性은 궁극적으로 Bourbon 王朝의 위기를 불가피하게 만드는 要因이 되었다.;The French seventeenth century has been a major interest among historians since the Second World War. The reason for this, at least in part, is that the seventeenth century saw the formation of the French 'Ancien Re´gime' and occupies therefore a determining position in the transformation of the late-medieval constitution in France into the political society known as absolutism. The purpose of this study is to examine the making of absolute monarchy by studying the sale of offices during 1598-1643. Venality of office is not merely the unique property of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The system of sale of offices had already developed considerably by the end of the Middle Ages. attaining its full maturity at the beginning of the seventeenth century with the 1egalisation of the right of hereditary succession to office. The imposition of the 'paulette' ('le droit annuel') in 1604 fixed the system in its final form. By sharing public power with an ambitious order of venal officeholders ('officiers'), the Bourbons not only filled the state service and the royal treasury, but also benefited politically from the rivalry between the officeholders and the military aristocracy. In fact, the upper bourgeoisie provided the crown with a convenient counterweight to the nobility. There was, however, another side to the question of venality, and that concerned the impact of a powerful and widespread order of 'officiers' upon the state and its policies. There had been a growing tendency to confuse the public functions with the private property. By rendering office venal and hereditable, the king alienated direct control of bureaucratic processes to a class who held their charges as their own possessions. The royal authority was, in short, limited by the acknowledged private ownership of administrative power in a form which could be described as a new kind of 'feuda1ity'. The 'officiers' formed a self-perpetuating elite that was, to be sure, dependent on the royal favor, but that would also defy the monarchy when their vital or selfish interests were threatened. Under the military, financial and social crisis during the Thirty Years War, their noncooperation posed a serious practical threat to the monarchy. Under Richelieu, therefore, the royal administration attempted to liquidate the system of venality: it confided part of the judicial and financial function to 'intendants'. With the systematic use of these 'commissaires', the crown freed itself of administrative restraint. The reduction of the power of 'officiers'. the last obstacle to absolutism, began, and it is said that "de la monarchie tempe´re´e par la ve´nalite´ des charges a｀ la monarchie absolue, c'e´tait le de´but d'une re´volution." In reaction to the administrative revolution, the alienated official classes sometimes forswore their role as instruments of public order and appeared to act in collusion with the forces of subversion. It was this critical situation that correlated with the popular seditions in the first half of the seventeenth century. which culminated in the Fronde in 1648. It is certain that the opposition of the officeholders to the absolutism was a move towards the ideal polity from their point of view. They, the sovereign courts particularly, opposed the excessive taxation resulting from the war, and they did not agree with the argument that the king could change the constitution as he saw fit. Yet the ideal was not the only polity which the officeholders would accept: their essential political requirements were much more limited. In short, they were concerned less with opposing political change for its own sake than with attempting to control it in their own interests. On the other hand, it is pointed out that the transition to the 'absolute' state has not undergone with any grand or systematic plan, but with an eye for expediency and practicality that was precisely what the situation required. It was rather a chaotic and disorganized process with piecemeal changes, representing the brutal acceleration of previous trends under the pressure imposed by a desperate war. In the unending conflicts and tensions between the crown and its 'officiers' concerning the sale of offices, therefore, neither side dared to make an overt attack on the other, resorting instead to more underhand methods of encroachment, bargaining and compromise. In conclusion, the fundamental ambiguity of the political changes inaugurated in this period brought the French absolutism to its natural limits, namely the continuance of privilege and the existing social structure, which constituted the ultimate danger to the Bourbon monarchy.