Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 최문섭 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-20T16:30:17Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-20T16:30:17Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0270-2592 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1475-6803 | - |
dc.identifier.other | OAK-27635 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.ewha.ac.kr/handle/2015.oak/255014 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Agency theory argues that pay for performance alleviates the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, the literature finds that institutional monitoring tends to promote the performance-pay linkage, thus aligning the two parties' incentives. We find that executive compensation rigidity is negatively and significantly associated with firm value. Moreover, ownership by long-term institutional investors reduces the pay rigidity of top managers in underperforming firms, thus decreasing the value-destroying effect of the rigidity. Overall, these results reaffirm the role of institutional monitoring in mitigating managerial rent extraction. | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | WILEY | - |
dc.title | HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE: INSTITUTIONAL MONITORING OF EXECUTIVE PAY RIGIDITY | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.relation.issue | 4 | - |
dc.relation.volume | 42 | - |
dc.relation.index | SSCI | - |
dc.relation.index | SCOPUS | - |
dc.relation.startpage | 789 | - |
dc.relation.lastpage | 816 | - |
dc.relation.journaltitle | JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jfir.12196 | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | WOS:000494576800001 | - |
dc.author.google | Choi, Paul Moon Sub | - |
dc.author.google | Chung, Chune Young | - |
dc.author.google | Hwang, Ji Hoon | - |
dc.author.google | Liu, Chang | - |
dc.contributor.scopusid | 최문섭(56258903600) | - |
dc.date.modifydate | 20210901081001 | - |