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Security Analysis of a Certificateless Signature from Lattices

Title
Security Analysis of a Certificateless Signature from Lattices
Authors
Chang, SeunghwanLee, Hyang-SookLee, JuheeLim, Seongan
Ewha Authors
이향숙이주희장승환
SCOPUS Author ID
이향숙scopus; 이주희scopus; 장승환scopus
Issue Date
2017
Journal Title
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
ISSN
1939-0114JCR Link1939-0122JCR Link
Publisher
WILEY-HINDAWI
Indexed
SCIE WOS
Abstract
Tian and Huang proposed a lattice-based CLS scheme based on the hardness of the SIS problem and proved, in the random oracle model, that the scheme is existentially unforgeable against strong adversaries. Their security proof uses the general forking lemma under the assumption that the underlying hash function.. is a random oracle. We show that the hash function in the scheme is neither one-way nor collision-resistant in the view of a strong Type 1 adversary. We point out flaws in the security arguments and present attack algorithms that are successful in the strong Type 1 adversarial model using the weak properties of the hash function.
DOI
10.1155/2017/3413567
Appears in Collections:
자연과학대학 > 수학전공 > Journal papers
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