Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | 최문섭 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-02-15T08:02:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-02-15T08:02:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0892-7626 | - |
dc.identifier.other | OAK-20045 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://dspace.ewha.ac.kr/handle/2015.oak/234477 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, we discuss optimal contract drafting between a lender with deficient monitoring capabilities and an agency-ridden borrower with insufficient budget to finance an investable project. The theoretical implications are as follows: First, the first best solution (FBS) is achievable under no hidden action. However, the borrower’s action is hardly observable in practice. Second, with unobservable managerial decisions the borrower exerts sub-optimal effort (moral hazard), and the probability of default increases. Lastly, with a penalizing discretion entitled to the bank on a long-term contract, the financial intermediary will be able to control the firm’s managerial action effectively such that the solution is equivalent to the FBS attained under no hidden action. Empirical implications are followed. © by author(s). | - |
dc.language | English | - |
dc.publisher | CIBER Institute | - |
dc.subject | Bank loan | - |
dc.subject | First best solution | - |
dc.subject | Moral hazard | - |
dc.subject | Optimal contract | - |
dc.title | Do bank loans curb corporate moral hazard? | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.relation.issue | 1 | - |
dc.relation.volume | 33 | - |
dc.relation.index | SCOPUS | - |
dc.relation.startpage | 115 | - |
dc.relation.lastpage | 122 | - |
dc.relation.journaltitle | Journal of Applied Business Research | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85007521357 | - |
dc.author.google | Choi P.M.S. | - |
dc.author.google | Choi J.H. | - |
dc.contributor.scopusid | 최문섭(56258903600) | - |
dc.date.modifydate | 20210901081001 | - |