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CEO pay for long-run performance: A dynamic view

Title
CEO pay for long-run performance: A dynamic view
Authors
Ahn J.-Y.
Ewha Authors
안지영
SCOPUS Author ID
안지영scopus
Issue Date
2015
Journal Title
Journal of Applied Business Research
ISSN
0892-7626JCR Link
Citation
vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 317 - 330
Keywords
CEO compensationDynamic agency viewLong-term performancePay for performance
Publisher
CIBER Institute
Indexed
SCOPUS scopus
Abstract
This study examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. We find that target pay levels are set on “long-run” past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Overall, the findings here indicate that a pay-for-contemporaneous-only-performance relationship significantly understates the incentive effects of CEO pay.
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경영대학 > 경영학전공 > Journal papers
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