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Top executives’ pay for long-run performance and corporate governance

Title
Top executives’ pay for long-run performance and corporate governance
Authors
Ahn J.-Y.
Ewha Authors
안지영
SCOPUS Author ID
안지영scopus
Issue Date
2016
Journal Title
Journal of Applied Business Research
ISSN
0892-7626JCR Link
Citation
vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 661 - 670
Keywords
BlockholdersCEO compensationDynamic agency viewLong-term performance
Publisher
CIBER Institute
Indexed
SCOPUS scopus
Abstract
This study examines the possibility that the quality of corporate governance has effects on the dynamic relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Building on the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance and corporate governance literature, we find that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to provide high powered long-run incentives to CEOs, indicating CEO incentive contracts can be replaced by the role of external corporate control when the external control mechanism is not functioning effectively from the optimal contracting view. Overall, the findings imply that firm’s governance mechanism can generate cross-sectional variations in CEO long-term incentive contracts. © by author(s).
DOI
10.19030/jabr.v32i2.9602
Appears in Collections:
경영대학 > 경영학전공 > Journal papers
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