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|dc.description||☞ 이 논문은 저자가 원문공개에 동의하지 않은 논문으로, 도서관 내에서만 열람이 가능하며, 인쇄 및 저장은 불가합니다.||-|
|dc.description.abstract||The North Korean brinkmanship tactics pertainig to the development of nuclear weapons has been largely regarded as irrational behavior, and North Korean has been described by many as a 'pariah state' or a 'rogue state'. In the academic filed, the study of North Korean has been considered somewhat problematic because of the lack of reliable information. Research on the Democratic Peopel's Repubic of Korea(DPRK) was judged by many scholars as 'speculative', and not fit for 'real academic pursuit'. However, the hermit Kingdom has become too important an issue to Northeast Asian security to brush aside as 'speculative'. Even if they are not armed with nuclear weapons, their conventional weapons includinh their arsenal of missiles establish a real threat to the korean peniesula, Northeast Asia, and the rest of the world. there is an urgent need to conduct more studies and research on North Korean, and their motives and behavior need analyzing. Although there may not be enough concrete information on their domestic motivations during the nuclear crisis, we can still try to analyze their known actions and motives. Igoring the North Korean issue would pose too much of a risk on Northeast Asian and world security. North koreans may have their own rational goals and aims as to why they behave in the way they do. In fact, their behavior may actually be an efficient way ti recevie what they want from their neighbors and the internatioal society without altering the domestic status quo. In short, North Korea's behavior, especially over its constant threat to develop abd test nuclear weapons, may be rational and worth analyzing. instead of something irratioanl which cannot be analyzed. Discussions regarding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have been mostly "emotionally charged and ideological." But both emotion and ideology hinder making clear judgment or poplicy descisoins. Regardless of whether or not ther is sufficient emporical evidence of North Korean intentions, decision makers have no choice but to choose which way they wikk take in diplomacy with th DPRK. Analyzion North Korea's behavior, and analyzing the reasons behind their morives will be beneficial for future policy-making in dealing with North Korea. Also, by assuming that they behabe in a way that is rational, it will be easier for decision makers to pridict how North Jorea will act in a given situation.||-|
|dc.description.tableofcontents||TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Introduction = 1 A. Goals of this thesis = 3 II. Chronology of Events for Both Nuclear Crises: 1993-1994 and 2002-2003 = 6 A. The origins of the crisis = 6 B. Nuclear crisis of 1993-1994 = 8 C. Signs of more trouble to come = 11 D. The second nuclear crisis, 2002-2003 = 12 E. Brief analysis of events = 17 III. Rational or Irrational? = 19 A. The North's Great Leader and Dear Leader = 19 B. Is North Korea a real threat to the Northeast Asian Security? = 24 IV. Realist and Rationalist Views Applied to North Korea's Motives for Pursuing Nuclear Programs = 27 V. The perceived North Korean motives for pursuing nuclear programs = 30 A. For Security and Deterrence = 30 Use of nuclear arsenal to deter U.S. nuclear use and to match the U.S. nuclear umbrella = 30 Nuclear arsenal as insurance against South Korean superiority in conventional weapons = 37 B. For Political Reasons = 44 Nuclear weapons as a means of obtaining diplomatic leverage = 44 Nuclear weapons as a means of securing regime maintenance = 50 Nuclear weapons as insurance against the loss of North Korea's traditional allies, China and Russia = 53 V. Conclusion = 56 Bibliography = 58||-|
|dc.title||Analysis of the DPRK's motives behind the North Korean nuclear crises||-|
|dc.title.subtitle||through the perspectives of realism and rationalism||-|
|dc.format.page||[ii], 64 leaves||-|
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