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미국의 통상정책 결정과정 연구

미국의 통상정책 결정과정 연구
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대학원 지역연구협동과정
이화여자대학교 대학원
In June 1990, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, president of Mexico, and George Bush, president of the United States, announced their intention to negotiate a free trade agreement between their countries. The general public paid little attention. nevertheless, the event was a historic turning point, a break from the animosity and indifference that had always characterized U.S-Mexican relations, and the beginning of an extraordinary three-year saga that would alter the political landscape of North America: the creation of a North American Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA). The negotiations concluded in the middle of the U.S presidential election campaign and immediately became an election issue. Independent candidate Ross Perot began warning that NAFTA would create a 'sucking sound' of U.S. jobs going to Mexico. President Bush, of course, was squarely for the agreement. Clinton delayed a decision as long as possible sought advice from all quarters, and then took a middle ground. He would support NAFTA but would insist that the labor and environment issues be addressed with supplemental agreements before he would submit the package to Congress for a vote. That a trade agreement became a central issue in a U.S. presidential campaign was surprising. Candidate Clinton's particule position seemed a curious formulation. The vast majority of the credible economic analyses showed net gains for all three countries-USA, Canada and Mexico, with very little dislocation for workers in the United States or Canada. This conclusion should not be surprising, since most of the changes required by NAFTA were in Mexico, where numerous sectors enjoyed trade protection, rather than in the considerably more open United States or Canada. For only a few sectors of the economy-generally low wage, currently protected sectors such as apparel and glass-could one confidently project losses for U.S. industries or workers. Even those studies that disagreed on one point: Those effects would be small. How, then, could a matter with relatively small and probably positive effects on the U.S economy(or for that matter on the environment, immigration, workers rights, or any of the other issues raised in the context of NAFTA) have become such an enormous political issue? What accounts for the alliance between such normally bitter rivals as Ralph Nader, Ross Perot, and Pat Buchanan? By September 1993, NAFTA was in political trouble. Faced with the strong possibility of defeat, NAFTA's advocates mounted a furious counterattack. On September 14, former Presidents George Bush, Jimmy Carter, and Gerald Ford joined President Clinton in the East room of the White house to kick off the campaign for NAFTA. What followed was an all-out campaign on many fronts. The president, his cabinet and an army of other administration officials; the former presidents and a host of other prominent Americans; CEOs and lesser officials of American business; and important elements of the environmental and hispanic American community joined in lobbying Congress. In the media, NAFTA supporters filled the newspaper op ed pages with testimonials; cabinet officers, members of Congress, and even the president appeared on television talk shows; the business lobby commissioned and ran election-style television commercials; and, most remarkably, Vice President Al Gore engaged Ross Perot in a debate on a popular cable television talk show, CNN's "Larry King Live." A less visible business-funded effort modeled after the grassroots organizing tactics of the opposition began to generate phone calls and letters from constituents in key Congressional districts. As the date neared, and NAFTA still lacked votes, the administration scrambled together a package that would win more support. A new development bank to clean up the environment along the U.S.-Mexican border won a couple votes; adjustments in the terms of the sugar, citrus, and vegetable agreements won some more. On November 17, NAFTA passed in the House by a margin of 234 to 200. Three days later it easily passed in the Senate, 61 to 38. But why did victory require such an enormous effort? What understandings of the political problem informed the strategies for and against NAFTA? And what strategies made the difference? This thesis has two goals. The first is to answer the question how the trade policy in the U.S has made. This is also the answer of how NAFTA ratification has processed. Since the U.S has risen to hegemonic status after two global military conflicts in the first half of the century, the country enjoyed golden age of economic prosperity in the 50's and the 60's. American economic hegemony, however, entered a declining phase in the 70's. Such a change in the relative status of the U.S. within the global economic order forced the U.S. to develop a North American regional economic bloc in an attempt to counter the impacts of the emerging economic power blocs of Europe and Japan. The neoliberal economic policies of Mexico also precipitated the formation of the North American free trade system by intensifying economic interdependence in the region. American multinational firms, including powerful agricultural cartels, pushed for the ratification of NAFTA, arguing that it is crucial to concluding successfully the Uruguay Round talks. The Clinton Administration and many prominent scholars proposed the managed trade, a combination of free trade and protectionism, as a strategy to restore American economic competitiveness. The debate surrounding NAFTA has been a divisive issue in the United States. Trade policies overall and the proposed U.S-Mexican agreement in particular are touching some strong defensive and nationalistic nerves. The agreement came at a time when U.S industries faced stiff competition from abroad, the economy was in recession, US workers were perceived as paying the price of a declining U.S edge in world markets, unemployment was rising, and the U.S public was deeply worried about the future. NAFTA has been strongly attacked by the leaders of organized labor, by environmental groups, and by such privileged sectors as the textile industry and Florida growers who already enjoy special government favors and subsidies that protect them from foreign competition. These groups often distorted the facts about NAFTA, exaggerated the potential harm accruing, spawned myths that NAFTA would harm both the United States and Mexico. But if NAFTA had been defeated, it would have harmed U.S global competitiveness, destroyed even more U.S jobs, raised prices for numerous goods and services, lowered the quality of U.S products, restricted choices for U.S consumers, and run the unacceptable risk of economically and politically destabilizing Mexico. The NAFTA debate has become something more than just a trade debate. The arguments over NAFTA illustrate how much trade policy has changed in the last two decades and how international and domestic politics have become intertwined. Tariffs used to be the concern, but this was a subject that was remote from most people's consciousness and without high political stakes or even visibility. A handful of experts and interest groups got together, hammered out their differences if necessary, and worked out an agreement. But now, the U.S and Mexican trade negotiations must also deal with 'hot' or 'new agenda' political topics such as pollution, the environment, drugs, human rights, and democratization. In addition, the negotiators must deal with subjects such as farm and industrial subsidies, patents and trademarks, industrial standards, child labor, minimum wages, unionization and labor rights, government purchasing, and investment issues-all areas that are close to the bone of national economic policymaking. Furthermore, these issues are coming to the fore in the midst of a severe U.S recession, in a post-Cold War era when all foreign policy issues have been increasingly politicized, and in a charged electoral arena where jobs and economic growth are the key and virtually only issue. As these new and more complex issues entered into trade discussions, both the interisity of the debate and the decibel level have risen.;북미자유무역협정은 1993년 11월 17일에 있었던 하원비준에서 234대 200으로 통과되었고 1994년 1월 1일부로 그 효력을 발생하였다. 본 논문에서는 NAFTA를 미국 통상정책을 이해하는 사례로 선택하였다. NAFTA가 성립된 배경이 무엇이고 본 협정이 추진되는 과정에서 나타나는 특징들은 무엇인가를 검토해 봄으로써 또한 미국 통상정책이 어떻게 결정되고 그 정책결정에 참여하는 행위자들은 누구이며 그들이 어떤 역할을 담당하는가를 알 수 있기 때문이다. 특히 NAFTA 비준은 미국 통상정책을 둘러싼 미국 내 격렬한 논쟁을 불러일으킨 가장 최근의 사례이기도 하다. 본 논문에서는 미국 통상정책에 대한 이론적 고찰이 필요하다고 판단하였다. 미국 대외정책에 대한 기존 이론들 중에서 권력엘리트론과 다원주의론을 선택한 것은 두 이론이 미국 내 정치와 사회를 설명하는데 유용하기 때문이다. 이는 곧 미국의 통상정책이 국외적 요인뿐만 아니라 국내적 요인과도 밀접히 연관되어 있다는 의미가 될 수 있다. 미국 내 통상정책 결정과정과 정책결정 행위자들의 행태를 분석하는 데는 정치적 구도가 필요하다. 통상정책 결정과정에서의 정치적 특성을 설명하고 통상정책과 국내정치 간의 관계가 밀접해지고 있다는 점, 다양한 기타 사회 집단들이 정책결정 과정에 참여한다는 점을 들었을 때 권력엘리트론과 다원주의가 이러한 특성들을 잘 설명해 주고 있다고 판단된다. 미국 통상정책이 결정되는 배경은 국제적 요인과 국내적 요인으로 나누어 생각할 수 있다. NAFTA가 성립된 배경에도 역시 국외적 요인과 국내적 요인이 있을 것이다. 세계질서에서의 미국의 지위 변화는 미국 통상정책의 변화를 가져온 요인이 되었다. 국내의 정치·경제적 요인 또한 통상정책 결정의 배경이 된다. 본 논문에서는 미국의 대외정책에서 멕시코와 미국 간의 관계가 차지하는 비중이 높다고 판단하였고 그 이유는 두 국가가 국경을 접하고 있기 때문이다. 두 국가 간 경제수준이나 생활수준의 차이가 심하기 때문에 국경문제나 이민문제 및 노동이슈는 미국과 멕시코 간 중요한 문제로 다루어지고 있다. 경제적 요인으로는 대기업집단의 요구와 미국 내 자유주의와 보호주의가 절충된 새로운 통상정책기조의 대두를 들 수 있다. 미국 통상정책 결정의 주요 행위자들은 대표적으로 대통령과 의회, 이익 집단 등이다. NAFTA 비준통과에 대해서도 이들이 찬반론을 형성하며 비준과정을 이끌어 나간다. 역시 찬성과 반대를 지지하는 각 세력들의 입장은 의회 내 비준통과에 대한 투표에 반영되어 나타난다. 북미자유무역협정의 비준과정을 통해 살펴 본 미국 내 통상정책 결정과정은 정책결정에 대한 정치세력과 사회 집단들 간의 이해관계가 얼마나 복잡한가를 보여준다. 협정의 미국 내 비준과정에서 각 집단들의 찬반구도가 어떻게 의회의 투표행태로 반영되는가, 그리고 협정을 통과시키기 위해 행정부가 의원들을 어떤 방법으로 설득해 나갔는가는 다른 미국 통상정책 결정과정에서도 나타날 수 있는 특징들이다. 국제적 상호의존이 심화되면서 경제문제나 통상정책이 중요해짐에 따라 정책결정자와 정책결정과정 요인들은 더 많은 영향력을 갖게 되었다. 이러한 점에서 북미자유무역협정 비준 과정은 통상정책 결정과정의 모습들을 잘 보여준다. 비준과정을 분석하기 위해 사용된 이론 틀과 본 협정이 추진된 국내외적 요인들, 정책결정에 참여하는 행위자들과 이들의 대립 및 연합구도를 살펴보는 것은 본 논문이 미국의 다른 통상정책 결정과정을 연구함에 있어서도 참고가 된다는 점에서 의미가 있을 것이다.
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