남북한 군사협상의제 연구

Abstract

본 논문은 2000년 6.15남북정상회담(이하 약칭, 6.15)을 전후한 남북한 군사협상의제의 변화를 비교함으로써 그간 남북한 간에 있었던 군사협상의제의 성격과 특징을 살펴보고 남북한 군사협상의 발전방안을 제시하는 것이 목적이다. 주지하다시피 남북한 군사협상에서 ‘협상의제’는 이데올로기적 특수성이라는 선입견 때문에 메시지 전달보다는 외교적 수사나 위협수단으로 치부되어, 연구자체가 제한됨으로써 남북한 군사협상에 대한 종합적인 이해를 방해하였다. 본 논문은 남북한 군사협상을 종합적으로 이해하려는 시도이다. 즉, ‘협상행태’위주의 연구로 그간 소홀히 다루어졌던 ‘협상의제’를 분석하여 남북한 군사협상을 종합적으로 이해하는데 기여하고자 한다. 이를 위해 본 논문은 2000년 6.15를 전후한 남북한 군사협상의제를 분석하였다. 분석한 항목은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 남북한 군사협상의 주요 의제를 파악하기 위해 남북한 군사협상의 의미와 배경을 검토하였다. 둘째, 6.15를 전후하여 남북한 군사협상의제의 성격이 어떻게 변화되었는가를 파악하기 위해 남북한 군사협상의제의 변화를 분석하였다. 셋째, 6.15를 전후하여 변화된 남북한 군사협상의제의 성격을 비교하여 군사협상의제의 특징과 나아가 군사협상의 성격을 분석하였다. 첫째, 남북한 군사협상은 정치외교적, 경제적, 군사적 배경에 의해 성립되었다. 그러나 2000년 6.15를 전후한 군사협상의 배경은 유사하면서도 달랐다. 6.15이전 군사협상은 정치외교적 배경, 6.15이후 군사협상은 경제적 배경의 영향을 많이 받았다. 이러한 차이는 남북한 군사협상의제의 변화로 나타났다. 즉, 6.15이전에는 정치외교적 목표를 달성하기 위하여 ‘본질적인 군사협상의제’를, 6.15이후에는 정치·경제적 목표를 달성하기 위하여 ‘현실적인 군사협상의제’를 각각 주요 협상의제화 하였다. 그 결과 6.15이전의 주요 협상의제는 ‘불가침과 평화협정’, ‘팀스피리트훈련’, ‘군축과 군사적 신뢰구축’으로, 6.15이후의 주요 협상의제는 ‘철도·도로연결’과 ‘서해해상우발충돌방지와 선전중지·수단제거’, ‘군축과 군사적 신뢰구축’으로 각각 선정되었다. 둘째, 남북한의 주요 군사협상의제를 ‘남북한 군사협상의제 평가가준’으로 분석한 결과, 2000년 6.15를 전후하여 남북한 군사협상의제의 ‘진정성’과 ‘공평성’은 의미있는 변화를 보이지 않았으나, ‘이행성’은 뚜렷한 변화를 보였다. 즉, ‘협상의제내용’을 분석한 ‘진정성’과 ‘의제협상방식’을 분석한 ‘공평성’은 6.15를 전후하여 지속되었으나, ‘의제합의결과’를 분석한 ‘이행성’은 6.15를 전후하여 변화되었다. 이는 협상의제내용이나 협상방식의 변화와 상관없이 이루어진 의제 합의결과 이행여부만의 변화였다. 따라서 6.15이전 군사협상의제가 ‘본질적인 군사협상의제’를 다루었으나 이행되지 못한 ‘선언적 군사협상의제’였다면, 6.15이후 군사협상의제는 ‘현실적인 군사협상의제’를 이행하여 실리를 추구한 ‘실리적 군사협상의제’였다. 셋째, 2000년 6.15를 전후한 남북한 군사협상의제의 성격변화는 ‘협상의제와 의제내용의 이중성’, ‘의제 협상순서의 이질성’, ‘의제 협상상대의 불균형성’, ‘의제 합의결과의 이행성’ 이라는 남북한 군사협상의제 특징의 지속과 변화로 나타났다. 6.15를 전후하여 남북한 군사협상의제의 특징 중 ‘협상 의제와 내용의 이중성’, ‘의제 협상순서의 이질성’, ‘의제 협상상대의 불균형성’은 지속되었으나, ‘의제 합의결과의 이행성’은 변화되었다. 그 중 이행성의 변화는 남북한 군사협상 성격의 변화에 영향을 미쳤다. 6.15이전의 남북한 군사협상은 남북한이 ‘본질적인 군사협상의제’를 선정하였으나, 군사적 목표보다는 정치적 목표에 집중한 결과, 의제 합의결과를 이행하지 않은 ‘선언적인 군사협상의제’로 전락한 ‘명분형 군사협상’이었다. 반면, 6.15이후의 군사협상은 남북한이 ‘현실적인 군사협상의제’를 선정하여, 안보에 위협이 되지 않는 범위 내에서 경제협력과 관련된 군사합의를 이행함으로써 정치·경제적 실리를 챙긴 ‘실리형 군사협상’이었다. 연구결과, ‘본질적·선언적인 군사협상의제’를 다룬 2000년 6.15이전의 ‘명분형 군사협상’은 6.15이후 ‘현실적·실리적인 군사협상의제’를 다룬 ‘실리형 군사협상’으로 변화되었다. 그것은 군사합의가 최초로 이행되었다는 측면에서 남북한 군사협상의 진전을 의미하는 변화이다. 그러나 아쉽게도 남북한 군사협상의 실리적인 변화는 ‘군사적 실리’와는 거리가 멀었다. 남북한은 군사협상을 하면서 ‘군사적 실리’보다는 ‘군사외적인 실리’에 집중하였다. 6.15이전에는 ‘정치적 실리’, 6.15이후에는 ‘정치·경제적 실리’ 특히 ‘경제적 실리’를 위해 군사협상을 각각 활용하였다. 따라서 남북한 군사협상의 진전을 위해서는 순수한 동기에서 비롯된 ‘군사적 실리’를 다루는 군사협상의제가 협의되어야 한다. 다시 말해서, 6.15이후의 ‘실리적 군사협상’이 ‘정치·경제적 실리’에 머무르지 않고 한반도의 군사적 긴장완화에 기여하는 ‘군사적 실리’로 확대될 때, 남북한의 군사협상은 ‘본질적인 군사협상의제’를 이행하는 ‘실질적인 군사협상’으로 발전할 수 있다.;The purpose of this research is to examine the characteristics and traits of military negotiations between South and North Korea that were conducted until today and to suggest a plan for development of inter-Korean military negotiation. This goal will be accomplished by comparing the changes of the inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation during the period before and after the 「June 15 South-North Joint Declaration」 in 2000. As is generally known, due to a common bias of ideological particularity, 'agendas of negotiation' had been dismissed as means of either diplomacy or threat rather than a conveyance of message. Such preconceptions posed limitations to the research itself, thereby hindering a comprehensive apprehension of inter-Korean military negotiations. This paper is an attempt to comprehensively understand the military negotiations between South and North Korea. In other words, it makes an endeavor to contribute to a much comprehensive understanding of inter-Korean military negotiations by analyzing the 'agendas of negotiation' that had been neglected all the while due to research that were focused upon 'negotiation behaviors'. Therefore, this research examined the changes of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation during the period before and after the Joint Declaration in 2000. The subjects of analysis are as follows: First, the significance and background of inter-Korean military negotiation were scrutinized to apprehend the main agendas of military negotiation between South and North Korea. Second, change of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation were analyzed to shed light on the characteristic transformations of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiation before and after the Declaration. Finally, the characteristics of agendas as well as traits of military negotiations were analyzed through comparison of the altered characteristics of inter-Korean agendas for military negotiations during this period. First of all, military negotiations between North and South Korea were established against the backdrop of political-diplomatic, economic, and military settings. However, the settings of military negotiations before and after the 2000 Joint Declaration were similar yet different. Military negotiations prior to the 「June 15 South-North Joint Declaration」 were mainly effected by political-diplomatic backgrounds, whereas those posterior to the Declaration were mostly influenced my economic environments. Such difference has been revealed through changes in inter-Korean agendas of military negotiations. In other words, 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation' became the principle negotiation agenda prior to the Joint Declaration in order to achieve political-diplomatic goals. Since the Declaration, however, 'realistic agendas of military negotiation' were the chief negotiation agendas for the purpose of attaining political·economic goals. As a result, principle agendas of negotiation prior to June 15th included 'Peace Agreement and Agreement on Non-aggression', 'Team Spirit', and 'arms reduction and military confidence building'. On the other hand, 'connecting railways', 'suspension of propaganda activities and removal of propaganda instruments, prevention of accidental maritime conflict on the West Sea' and 'arms reduction and military confidence building' were selected as main agendas after June 15th Declaration. Moreover, two different results were yielded from the analysis on the main inter-Korean agendas of military negotiation that was based on 'a point of reference of inter-Korean agendas of military negotiation'. Throughout the period before and after the 「June 15 South-North Joint Declaration」 there were no significant changes to the 'genuineness' and 'equitability' of the agendas, while 'performance' exhibited a distinct change. This implies that 'genuineness', which analyzed the 'contents of negotiation agendas', and 'equitability', which analyzed the 'method of agenda negotiation', were both sustained during this period. However, a category that analyzed the 'execution of results of agenda agreement'－'performance'－underwent change. This suggests that such transformation was caused solely by the execution of the results of the agenda agreements, rather than by alternations in the contents of negotiation agendas or methods of negotiation. Therefore, whereas the agendas of military negotiations prior to the Joint Declaration were 'declaratory agendas of military negotiations' that dealt with but did not execute the 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation', those posterior to the Declaration were 'pragmatic agendas of military negotiation' that pursued actual benefits by implementing 'realistic agendas of military negotiation'. Finally, the characteristics of inter-Korean agendas of military negotiation before and after the Declaration in 2000 exhibited continuance as well as change in traits such as 'duplicity of negotiation agendas and contents of agendas', 'heterogeneity of order of agenda negotiation', 'disproportion between parties in agenda negotiation', and 'performance of results of agenda negotiation'. The first three among the four traits were maintained, while 'performance of results of agenda negotiation' showed changes. In addition, the characteristics of military negotiations between the two Koreas were influenced by the changes in performance. Although 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation' were selected prior to the Joint Declaration, inter-Korean military negotiations focused on political goals, thus they became 'nominal military negotiation' that degenerated into mere 'declaratory agendas of military negotiation'. Meanwhile, after the Declaration in 2000, both Koreas chose 'realistic agendas of military negotiation', thus military negotiations during this period were those of 'pragmatic military negotiations' from which the involved parties derived political and economic benefits by executing military agreements related to economic cooperation within grounds that no security threats would be involved. In conclusion, the 'nominal military negotiation' prior to the 2000 Joint Declaration that dealt with the 'intrinsic·declaratory agendas of military negotiation' was transformed after the Declaration into 'pragmatic military negotiation' that dealt with 'realistic·pragmatic agendas of military negotiation'. This transformation signifies progress of inter-Korean military negotiations in that agreements were put into practice. Unfortunately, however, pragmatic changes of inter-Korean military negotiations was distant from 'military benefits'. During the course of their military negotiations, South and North Korea concentrated on 'benefits external to military domains' rather than 'military benefits'. Military negotiations were utilized in behalf of 'political benefits' prior to the Joint Declaration. After the Declaration, however, it was used in the interest of 'economic·political benefits', especially 'economic benefits'. Therefore, in order to induce progress in inter-Korean military negotiations, it is essential to discuss agendas of military negotiations that deal with 'military benefits' derived from pure motives. In other words, military negotiation between South and North Korea can develop into 'substantial military negotiation' that execute 'intrinsic agendas of military negotiation' when 'pragmatic military negotiation' since the Joint Declaration extends beyond 'economic·political benefits' to 'military benefits' that contribute to alleviating military tension within the Korean Peninsula.