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獨禁法上 市場支配力 規制에 關한 硏究

Title
獨禁法上 市場支配力 規制에 關한 硏究
Other Titles
(A) Study on regulations of market(Dominating) fower in anti-trust law : With special reference to cases in advanced countries
Authors
姜閏玉.
Issue Date
1981
Department/Major
대학원 법학과
Keywords
시장지배력독점규제법독금법
Publisher
이화여자대학교 대학원
Degree
Master
Abstract
資本主義國家에서는 市民의 經濟的 自由를 保障할 것과 自由롭고 公正한 競爭秩序를 前提로 한 市場의 價格機構를 通하여 資源의 最適配分을 도몸할 것을 특징으로 한다. 그러나 資本主義가 高度化되면서 大企業에 의한 市場支配現象이 나타나고, 自由競爭經濟에 의한 豫測調和가 달성될 수 없게 되자 이와같은 競爭制限要因을 國家의 公權力에 의하여 除去할 필요가 있게 되었고 이러한 요청에 부응하여 制定된 法이 獨占規制法이다. 이러한 관점에서 볼 대 市場支配力의 排除는 獨占規制法의 持柱에 속한다할 것이다. 우리나라 「獨占規制 및 公正去來에 關한 法律」 第2章에서는 市場支配力의 濫用을 規制하고 있으며, 第3章에서는 競爭을 實質的으로 制限하는 다시말해서 市場支配力을 形成하는 企業結合을 制限하고 있다. 한편 여기에는 多數의 適用除外도 認定되고 있다. 그러면 무엇때문에 이와같이 多樣한 規制方法이 채용되는 것일가, 거기에는 經濟力의 集中 自體가 가지고 있는 長短点을 中心으로 複雜한 문제들이 연결되어있다. 그 뿐만 아니라, 어느 程度의 市場支配力을 規制해야되며, 市場支配力을 認定하는 데에는 어떠한 規準이 이용되는 것인지, 그리고 市場支配力을 論할때 關聯市場의 범위를 어떻게 定하는 것이 合理的인 것인지 등에 관한 諸問題가 市場支配力規制와 관련하여 해결되지 않으면 안된다. 특히 우리나라의 獨占規制法은 制定의 歷史가 짧고 實際適用의 경험도 全無한데 비해 앞으로 同法이 적용될 事例의 發生확률은 매우 높다고 본다. 따라서 本論文에서는 이상에서 指摘된 문제점이 선진 각국에서는 어떻게 해결되고 있고 또 어떻게 해결되어져야 할 것인가를 가능한한 실제의 事例를 토대로 다음과 같은 순서에 따라 分析검토 하였다. 序論에 이어 第2章에서는 獨占力 規制의 一般類型과 各國의 法制를 槪說하였다. 第3章에서는 市場支配力 決定 문제와 관련하여 關聯市場의 劃定과 市場支配力 槪念이 各國의 法律下에서 어떻게 定義되고 있는지를 살피고, 外國製品의 代替性이 市場支配力 決定에 어떻게 作用하는지를 검토하였다. 第4章에서는 合倂과 獨占에 依한 市場支配力의 形成과 旣存市場支配的 企業의 特定行爲에 대한 措置의 規準을 吟味하였다. 이것은 「競爭을 實質的으로 減殺하는 것」 「獨占行爲」 「濫用」 「公共利益의 侵害」 「不當한 價格 및 去來條件」等의 規準에 관한 것이다. 아울러 本章에서는 合倂, 獨占行爲 또는 强力한 企業의 特定行爲의 有害한 影響이 認定된 후 各國 法律下에서 실시되고 있는 措置의 手段에 관해서 검토되었다. 이것은 政府 介入의 節次的 方法고 公的機關 및 個人이 利用할 수 있는 制裁에 관한 것이다. 끝으로 第5章에서는 市場支配力規制에 관한 두가지의 接近方法 즉 構造的 接近方法과 行爲的 接近方法을 相互 比較 검토하였다.;This study analysed restrictive trade practices in the advanced countries to the extent where those acts explicitly provide about market power. There are three basic approaches to regulating market power. One is the structural approach which aims at anti-competition merger and monopoly, the other is the behavioral approach which centres upon particular business activities of massive enterprises, and the third approach is the combination of the two methods. Most laws are based on the behavioral approach and few are directed to the structural approach. The American Law, the most advanced system of structural regulation, includes some factors of behavioral regulation in connection with the market power. The examples of the combination of structural and behavioral regulations, although the structural factor is very weak, can be seen in Canada, Japan and U.K. Some other countries employ behavioral regulation, none the less some organisational factors are included in the form of registration in case of major mergers (in Korea, Germany and Spain) or in the form of restriction to the organization in case of exessive abuse of the market power (in Belgium). The matter concerning how various approaches can be evaluated to solve problems concerning market powers and also what kind of recommendation can be made for the improvement in future policies requires not only the analysis in details of those reasons why a particular law system employs the structural approach or the behavioral approach but also at least some information on the practical economic effect of employing the particular approach. However the latter is in essence a matter of economic analysis, not a legal study. The precise reason why a country employs the structural, behavioral or the combined approach normally can not be identified definitely, but can be deduced from provisions of laws. It can be said that the basic structural approach reflects a belief that maintaing the effective competition should be given priority over any other economic policy objective and the effective competition can be maintained only when a market structure is created and maintained to stimulate the competitive activities among enterprises. The general idea that forms the basis of the behavioral approach is that any change in market structure, particularly interference with mergers, is not necessary. It is considered that the negative effect on market power, if any, can be effectively cured by factors other than regulations on structures, such as regulation on activities or approach to a free market to foster potential competition. On the other hand, intervention in market structure can obstruct accomplishment of economic policy objectives, which has priority to policies to preserve competition, for example, promotion of syndication of en terprises to attain the economy of size or other economic advantages, or to strengthen domestic industry's position over foreign competitors. In order to give the right priority to the basic assumptions and various economic policy objectives, it is necessary to understand them in relation to the general economic objective and the political environment of the country. But we can have following conclusion as a result of the analysis to the currently effective market power regulation acts which have been discussed so far. The pure structural approach can not be the means good enough to solve all the problems of market power. Laws on mergers and monopoly can not contain market powers of every form, particularly those resulting from a growth in normal business activities. There can also exist market power positions to which organisational regulations such as dissolution or disposal of property can not be enforced due to various reasons or when a merger was formed before the enforcement of regulation. The model case is the oligopoly. It is not certain whether an oligopoly can be an object of anti-monopoly law and whether the breaking-up of each individual enterprise forming the oligopoly can change the form of business activities. Therefore an advocacy of behavioral procedure can remain under regulations which strictly prohibit anti-competition mergers and monopolistic activities. On the other hand pure behavioral approach is not regarded as a measure good enough to maintain effective competition. The reason is that it is doubtful in the long time, an ill-effected law can warranty expected advantages of competition if the practices of merger and monopolistic activities bring about monopolistic market situation and destroy even the competition of minimum degree required, even though those factors regulating the market power are strong enough. Therefore, it is considered that a law should provide, as a principle, a minimum basis to interfere with an extreme change in market structure which would endanger maintaining the minimum degree of competition in the long time in main markets. Thus the combination of structural and behavioral regulatory factors in considered an appropriate measure. However, the matter of how the factors should be combined and to which side of two factors, behavioral and structural, should be given more weight in connection with various conditions of each country should eventually be decided after considering various factors such as the scope of regulations in restrictive trade practices acts as a whole, the role of competition in the economic policy, the present industrial structure, and the priority given to the structural change required for economic rationalisation.
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